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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S "AGGRESSIVE"
APPROACH TO CONSUMER PROTECTION
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
DAVID HEFFERNAN*

N RECENT YEARS, the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), through a combination of wide-ranging rulemakings
and aggressive enforcement activity, has expanded the scope of
its consumer protection-focused regulation of air transportation
to a level that is unprecedented in the thirty years since Congress "deregulated" the domestic airline industry. As a result, air
carriers and ticket agents today must comply with a highly detailed code of regulations, supplemented by extensive agency
guidance interpreting those regulations. Any deficiencies in
compliance, however inadvertent, may expose a regulated party
to DOT enforcement action. In such cases, the regulated party
typically faces a Hobson's choice between paying a substantial
civil penalty (and enduring the opprobrium of a DOT-published
consent order) or engaging in litigation against its regulator.
Not surprisingly, most air carriers and ticket agents reluctantly
accede to the first option.
DOT touts its expansionist approach to regulation and enforcement as a boon to consumers. Yet, DOT's expansion, and
vigorous enforcement, of its regulatory scheme have increasingly resulted in the substitution of DOT's judgment (in place
of market forces) as a primary determinant of outcomes for consumers. DOT's approach is based on an assumption that, but for
* David Heffernan is a member of Cozen O'Connor, based in the Washington,
D.C., office, where he co-chairs the firm's Aviation Practice. He is Editor-in-Chief
of the American Bar Association's Air & Space Lawyer publication and co-editor
of the book, AVIATION REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, published by the
American Bar Association in 2014. In his practice, he represents U.S. and foreign
air carriers (including Lufthansa) and ticket agents. A version of this article was
presented as part of a panel discussion at a conference of the American Bar
Association's Forum on Air & Space Law in Washington, D.C. on February 20,
2015. The author thanks Ken Hines for his assistance in preparing this article.
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DOT's intervention, consumers would be at the mercy of air carriers and ticket agents' unfair or deceptive practices in an environment in which market forces are an ineffective check on
such anti-consumer conduct. As DOT continues to expand the
scope of its regulatory and enforcement activities, however, critics object that DOT is exceeding its statutory authority and has
failed to demonstrate that regulation is necessary to prevent actual or likely consumer harm. In addition, DOT has often failed
to provide persuasive (and, in some cases, any) empirical evidence that the benefits of its regulations exceed their costs,
which unquestionably hurt the airlines' bottom-line, but ultimately are likely to be borne by consumers. Some recent and
proposed DOT regulations also threaten to curb the ability of
air carriers and ticket agents to harness technological innovation and the power of the Internet in new ways that offer great
potential to benefit consumers, but often do not fit well within
the ever-stricter confines of DOT's regulatory regime. DOT has
tended to focus on the collateral (and unquantified) risk of consumer confusion or deception rather than on promoting (or at
least not inhibiting) innovations that could benefit consumers.
This article reviews the scope of DOT's regulatory authority,
then examines some specific examples of DOT regulations and
enforcement activity. In doing so, this article considers some basic, troubling questions: Has DOT exceeded its statutory authority? How much DOT regulation is too much? Has DOT passed a
tipping point where regulation becomes so costly and restrictive
that it harms consumers more than it helps them?
I.

THE SCOPE OF DOT'S "CONSUMER PROTECTION"
AUTHORITY UNDER 49 U.S.C. § 41712

Section 41712 of the Transportation Code authorizes DOT to
"investigate and decide whether an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition in air
transportation or the sale of air transportation."1 Section 41712
does not direct DOT to regulate "in the public interest"-the statute is more specific than that.2 DOT must find that a specific
practice is "unfair or deceptive" or "an unfair method of competition."' 3 Section 41712 focuses on how DOT may respond to evil 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a).
2

See id.

3 Id.
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dence of unfair or deceptive practices that either are ongoing or
have already occurred.' Thus, the section must be read as requiring evidence of an unfair or deceptive practice, not merely
speculation about what may occur or an assumption that a particular practice that seems objectionable to DOT therefore must
be unfair or deceptive.
Section 41712 presents a challenge for DOT to determine
(and ultimately for the courts to adjudicate) how to regulate in
the context of a statutory scheme that specifically recognizes the
benefits of the free market (49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) instructs
DOT to "plac[e] maximum reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition."). 5 Thus, regulation should only occur in response to market failure or clear
evidence of necessity of government action to prevent actual
consumer harm. Congress's intention, when deregulating the
domestic airline industry and transitioning a significantly circumscribed scope of authority from the Civil Aeronautics Board
to DOT, intended that market forces be allowed to flourish without the heavy hand of government regulation. 6
The language of section 41712 is substantively identical to
that of section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
U.S.C. § 45).7 This suggests that Congress wanted the same consumer protection standard to apply to air transportation as to

other industries but wanted an industry-specialist agency
(DOT), rather than the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to be
the regulator.' Thus, the FTC's interpretations of its identical
4 DOT's authority under section 41712(a) is injunctive in nature. Id. ("[i]f the
Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, finds that an air carrier,
foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or
unfair method of competition, the Secretary shall order the air carrier, foreign
air carrier, or ticket agent to stop the practice or method").
5 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a) (6).
6 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995) (the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) was intended to "leave largely to the airlines themselves...
the selection and design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing
of air transportation services"); Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) ("Congress, determining that 'maximum reliance on competitive market forces' would
best further 'efficiency, innovation, and low prices,' as well as 'variety [and] quality... of air transportation services, enacted the [ADA]"); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 674 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the ADA "replaced the old form of regulation with a new economic regime that relied heavily on free-market
mechanisms").
7 See 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a); 15 U.S.C. § 45.
8 Ironically (in light of DOT's recent proclivity for protracted, large-scale
rulemaking proceedings), one reason why Congress decided to vest this authority
in DOT rather than the FIC was "'the prolonged rulemaking procedures which
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statutory mandate should be viewed as an authoritative reference point for DOT. After all, the FTC is an agency with a
longer history and deeper experience of applying this statutory
authority to a wide range of industries.
The FTC's test for determining whether an act or practice is
"deceptive" requires actual evidence: (1) of an intent to deceive
(e.g., a material misrepresentation by act or omission); and (2)
that such conduct has or is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer with respect to material information, to the consumer's
detriment.9 This requires evidence of the act or omission and
intent of the regulated party, as well as evidence of consumer
harm.10 Where no actual consumer harm can be demonstrated,
the question is one of likelihood to mislead or deceive a reasonable consumer. 1 The FTC applies a presumption that market
forces inherently constrain the likelihood of deception.' 2 In
other words, deception is only likely in instances of market failure, such as impairment or disabling of a reasonable consumer's
ability to obtain and act upon the information necessary to avoid
deception. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair,
the FTC refers to "unjustified consumer injury," which it defines
as an injury that is (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers and competition; and (3) one
that "consumers could not reasonably have avoided."' 3
DOT enjoys the benefit of Chevron deference: if the statute is
silent or ambiguous, then "the court must sustain [DOT's] interFTC is required to undertake under the Magnuson-Moss Act."' United Air Lines,
Inc. v. CAB, 766 F.2d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting the legislative history of
the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98443 (1984), H.R.
REP. No. 793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984)).
9 In re Cliffdale Assocs. Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) (App.: FTC Policy
Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983)); see 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) ("the [FTC] shall
have no authority ... to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that
such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition").
10 See In re Cliffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 174.
11 Id.
12

Id. at 181.

13 In re Int'l

Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 97 (1984) (App.: Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17,
1984)); see also Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg.
5498, 5502-04 (Jan. 29, 2009) (describing the FTC's standards for determining
unfairness). For a more detailed account of FTC interpretations of "unfair or
deceptive practices," see Comments of American Airlines, Inc., Sept. 29, 2014
(Docket DOT-OST-2014-0056), at 3-8.
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pretation of a statute it administers ... if [its interpretation] is

'based on a permissible construction of the statute."' 14 In the
Sabre decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that DOT's statutory authority is broad
and that "'statutes written in broad, sweeping language should
be given broad, sweeping application.' 1 5 The Sabre court also
stated that DOT may apply its statutory authority in ways Congress might not have originally anticipated.1 "
In sum, DOT can act (whether by regulation or enforcement
action) with the confidence that regulated parties are reluctant
to litigate against their regulators and that, if they do seek judicial review, they face a daunting challenge to overcome the
courts' "substantial deference" to agencies' interpretation of
their own statutory authority and regulations. Such judicial deference, however, should not lead DOT to disregard its obligation to maintain a balance between, on the one hand, allowing
market forces to operate and, on the other hand, regulating,
when necessary, in response to actual evidence of market failure
or consumer harm. DOT also should not underestimate the
costs and risks associated with adopting detailed, wide-ranging
regulations. As the following sections demonstrate, however,
DOT, in some cases, may have failed to strike that balance. 7
II.

DOT'S DETAILED AND CONTROVERSIAL
REGULATIONS

Critics cite numerous examples of overreaching regulation by
DOT. This article focuses on two notorious recent examples of
DOT proposals to expand the scope of its regulations: the socalled "Passenger Protections 3" or "PP3" notice of proposed
14 Sabre, Inc. v. DOT, 429 F.3d 1113, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
15 Id. at 1124-25 (quoting Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 298
(D.C. Cir. 2003)).
16 Id. (quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001) ("'a statute
[such as DOT's] can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress'")).
17 This concern applies not only to DOT's approach to regulation under section 41712, but also with respect to other statutory provisions. See infra note 64
(discussing the current controversy over DOT's proposal to interpret 49 U.S.C.
§ 46301(a) as authorizing DOT to impose civil penalties on a per-passenger basis,
even though the statutory text only authorizes the assessment of violations on a
per-flight or per-day basis).
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rulemaking (PP3 NPRM) " and the advance NPRM considering
the adoption of a ban on the use of cell phones to make voice
calls on aircraft (Voice Calling ANPRM) :
PP3:DOT has proposed to require airlines to display detailed
ancillary fee information at all points of sale, on the first web
page on which a fare is displayed, including passenger-specific
fee information. DOT claims this proposed rule is necessary to
ensure "transparency," but carriers' websites already must include prominent disclosures of all ancillary fees.20 Yet DOT
states that it "lack[s] sufficient data to be able to quantify the
extent" to which consumers are currently able to "price shop
for air transportation in an effective manner" and requests information about "whether it is difficult to find baggage and
seat assignment fee information and how much of an impact
this has on their ability to comparison shop among carriers. "21
If this rule is implemented, it will require expensive
reprogramming of booking engines and fundamental rede22
sign of websites.
18 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket DOT-OST-2014-0056, 79 Fed. Reg.
29,970 (May 23, 2014) [hereinafter PP3 NPRM]. For a diversity of perspectives on
the PP3 NPRM, see 27 No. 3 AIR & SPACE LAW. 3 (2014).
19 Use of Mobile Wireless Devices for Voice Calls on Aircraft, Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket DOT-OST-2014-0002, 79 Fed. Reg. 10049 (Feb.
24, 2014) [hereinafter Voice Calling ANPRM].
20 14 C.F.R. § 399.85(d). DOT already regulates fare displays on carrier and
ticket agent websites with great specificity. See 14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a) (regulating
the font size of display of the total fare relative to the separate display of the
amount of government-imposed fees and taxes that are included in the total
fare).
21 PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29975. DOT subsequently clarified that "the
purpose of the rule is not to enable comparison shopping, but rather to ensure
that consumers are aware of the total cost of travel." DOT Meeting with A4A, at 4
(response to Question #9) (Aug. 7, 2014) (Docket DOT-OST-2014-0056).
22 DOT has previously acknowledged "the limits imposed by Congress on our
authority to regulate the airline and airline distribution businesses. Congress has
given us the authority to prevent practices that violate the antitrust laws or antitrust principles and practices that are deceptive, but no comprehensive oversight
authority over airline distribution." Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 976, 978 (Jan. 7, 2004) (Final Rule). Despite those prior expressions of caution about regulating airline distribution, DOT, in the PP3
NPRM, also proposes to require airlines to provide ancillary service fee information to Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) and travel agents. This new proposal
would insert DOT into the commercial relationships between airlines and
GDSs-something DOT said it would no longer do when it eliminated its CRS
rules a decade ago. Ironically, this proposal comes at a time when airlines and
each of the "big three" GDSs are negotiating agreements for the distribution of
fee and other information about ancillary services-precisely the type of informa-
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Voice Calling Ban Proposal: in the Voice Calling ANPRM, DOT
considers whether to adopt a rule to ban voice communications on passengers' mobile wireless devices on flights to, from
and within the United States. DOT would impose this ban
pursuant to its authority to prohibit practices that are "unfair,"
but not deceptive, under section 41712.23 Such a regulatory
prohibition would deny air carriers the right to determine
whether and, if so, how their passengers might be permitted
to make voice calls during flight even though non-U.S. carriers have offered this service for years.24 Indeed, U.S. carriers
also have offered the service using phones installed in seatbacks.
If DOT finalizes these proposed rules, stakeholders may seek
judicial review. Such a review may focus on whether, by adopting
such rules, DOT exceeded its statutory authority under 49
U.S.C. § 41712. Courts generally accord "substantial deference"
to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. '25 Regulations, however, must be "reasonable and.., supported by substantial evidence in the record. '26 Yet DOT's proposals lack the
support of "substantial evidence" of actual consumer harm;
rather, DOT has largely relied on its own speculation or assumptions about the risk of consumer harm.
tion distribution DOT would require by regulation. See David A. Berg, DOT's
'Transparencyof Airline Ancillary Fees' Rulemaking is Bad Policy and Wrong on the Law,
27 No. 3 AIR & SPACE LAw. 3, 3 (2014) (citing Travelport's agreements with
twelve airlines, including Delta, American, and Air Canada, to sell ancillary services; Sabre's similar agreements with United and US Airways; and Amadeus' similar agreements with American and other carriers).
23 Voice Calling ANPRM, supra note 19, at 10051 (DOT, echoing the FTC's
interpretation, states that practices are "unfair" under section 41712 "if they are
harmful to passengers but could not be reasonably avoided by passengers"). DOT
also states that it could impose such a ban pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41702 on the
basis that voice calling during flight would "be inconsistent with adequate air
transportation." Voice Calling ANPRM, supra note 19, at 10049. Section 41702,
however, only applies to interstate air transportation and so would not provide a
legal basis for imposing a ban on flights to and from the United States.
24 For example, Emirates has allowed voice calling on flights outside the
United States since 2008 and reports that its passengers have made more than
one million inflight calls using their own cell phones. Emirates only ever received
two complaints from passengers about such calls. Comments of Emirates (Mar.
25, 2014) (Docket DOT-OST-2014-0002).
25 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. DOT, 687 F.3d 403, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 1723 (2013).
26 Id. at 416.
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A.

MEASURING WHETHER THE BENEFITS OF

DOT's

RULES

EXCEED THEIR COSTS

Executive Order 12866 requires DOT to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for any "significant" action, such as the PP3 NPRM.27
The NPRM's cost-benefit analysis has been the target of derision, with critics arguing that, on cost/benefit grounds alone,
DOT has failed to establish a basis for finalizing the proposed
rule.28 Under DOT's own analysis, quantifiable costs exceed
quantifiable benefits by nearly two to one ($46.2 million versus
$25.1 million over ten years).29 Overall, the rulemaking would
impose a net cost (negative benefit) of $53.8 million."0 DOT attempts to circumnavigate this huge benefits deficit by claiming
that "unquantified" benefits will exceed unquantified costs: if
consumers are willing to pay one cent more per trip for what the
rule will offer them, overall benefits will exceed costs." This rationale would obviate the need for cost/benefit analysis; after
all, why have a requirement to develop an objective, empirical
accounting of costs and benefits if the agency may simply override the "quantified" results by conjuring "unquantified" additional factors to reach a new result that supports the agency's
proposed regulation? In any event, the cost to consumers would
not be a penny per trip. That "quantified" $53.8 million cost
would not simply be borne by air carriers and ticket agents, but
ultimately by consumers. That figure also does not include the
cost of potentially denying consumers access to new services that
may not be implemented if DOT imposes additional regulatory
impediments to innovation.

2

27 Exec. Order. No. 12866 § 1(a), 50 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
28 David A. Berg, DOT's 'Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees' Rulemaking is Bad

Policy and Wrong on the Law, 27 No. 3 AIR & SPACE LAw. 3, 4-5 (2014).
29 See PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29972, 29993-94.
30 See id.; HDR, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INITIAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

FOR PROPOSED CONSUMER RULEMAKING REGARDING TRANSPARENCY OF AIRLINE ANCILLARY FEES AND OTHER CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES 2 (Apr. 16, 2014).
31 PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29993 ("if the value of the unquantified benefits, per passenger, is any amount greater than one cent, and unquantified costs
are minimal, then the entire rule is net beneficial. In other words, if passengers

are willing to pay, on average, one penny per trip for all eight provisions of the
proposal, then the value of the proposal outweighs its costs.").
32 Berg, supra note 28, at 5.
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DOT's
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RELIANCE ON GUIDANCE INTERPRETING
ITS OWN REGULATIONS

DOT's increasing propensity for large-scale, multi-issue "passenger protections" rulemakings has spawned a related phenomenon: an increasing reliance by DOT on the issuance of
detailed supplementary written guidance (often in the form of
answers to "frequently asked questions" or "FAQs"). 3- While
such guidance may not be legally binding, it effectively constitutes notice to regulated parties (for enforcement purposes) of
DOT's interpretation of its own regulations. 4 In some cases,
such interpretive guidance has appeared to establish new requirements or broaden the scope or applicability of DOT's regu35
lations. For example, in April 2011, DOT issued a final rule
that included a new regulation prohibiting any seller of scheduled air transportation from increasing the price of that transportation for a consumer after the consumer has purchased the
transportation. 6 In a written response to a series of subsequently issued FAQs, DOT introduced an interpretation of that
rule that was not discussed in the final rule: that DOT deems the
post-purchase price rule to prohibit a seller of air transportation
from "increase[ing] the price of that air transportation, even
when the fare is a 'mistake."3' Thus, under this interpretation
(which DOT adopted without prior notice and public comment), if, due to a temporary technical problem, a carrier were
to advertise a patently erroneous fare, for example, for travel
from New York (JFK) to Abu Dhabi for $187, and hundreds of
consumers were to purchase that fare, the carrier would be re33 See generally, OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS,
TRANsP., ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE

DEP'T OF
ENFORCE-

MENT OF THE SECOND FINAL FULE ON ENHANCING AIRLINE PASSENGER PROTECTION,

(Aug. 19, 2011; revised Sept. 6, 2011, Oct. 19, 2011,Jan. 11, 2012, andJune 15,
2012), www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/EAPP-2-FAQ.pdf
[hereinafter
EAPP #2].
34 See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, No. 13-1041, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Mar. 9,
2015).
35 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25,
2011) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 244, 250, 253, 259, and 399).
36 Prohibition on Post-Purchase Price Increase, 14 C.F.R. § 399.88 (2012) (the
only exception DOT recognizes is that carriers may increase the price postpurchase in the case of an increase in a government-imposed tax or fee, but only
if the passenger was advised of such a potential price increase before purchasing
a ticket).
37 EAPP #2, supra note 33, at 45 (answer to Question #8 in Section IX).
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quired to honor those tickets regardless of the cost to the
carrier. 38
DOT's interpretation, which did not entertain the possibility
of exceptional circumstances, lacked any acknowledgment of
what essentially all carriers and many opportunistic consumers
know: that websites exist that specialize in detecting these types
of "mistake fares" and alerting consumers about the opportunity
to purchase them before the carrier realizes its error and corrects the fare.3 9 DOT's guidance suggested a form of strict liability for carriers with respect to "mistake fares," even though it is
self-evident that such errors involve no intent to deceive consumers and the party most likely to be harmed by the error is
the airline itself, not consumers who purchase tickets knowing
that the fare is an error. DOT's position was at odds with FTC
policy as well as federal and state law. As the FTC has noted,
"there is no federal statute requiring merchants . . .to honor

erroneous pricing unless it is misleading or deceptive."4 DOT is
now reviewing the issue of mistaken fares as part of the pending
PP3 rulemaking, having belatedly recognized that "increasingly
mistaken fares are getting posted on frequent-flyer community
blogs and travel-deal sites, and individuals are purchasing these
tickets in bad faith and not on the mistaken belief that a good
deal is now available.'

58 Ted Reed, Etihad: We Will Honor the Ridiculously Low Fares We Mistakenly Offered, FORBES, Dec. 28, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/2014/12/28/
etihad-we-will-honor-the-ridiculously-low-fare-ticke ts-we-mistakenly-offeredued/.
This also was the case in 2012 when consumers rushed to buy tickets to Myanmar
that were mispriced after a currency devaluation. Evelyn D. Sahr & Drew M.
Derco, Airlines Need Protection Too, 26 No. 1 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, at 14 (2013)
(citing a $125 one-way, first-class fare from Yangon, Myanmar to Montreal, Canada, among other examples of fares that were "clearly erroneous (in many cases
less than one percent of the correct fare)").
39 See, e.g., AIRFAREWATCHDOG, www.airfarewatchdog.com/top-50-fares/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2015).
40 See Sahr & Derco, supra note 38, at 16 n.32 (quoting an FTC spokesman as
stating that "'[h] onest mistakes do happen, and a transaction can be undone').
In addition, "most state laws allow a merchant to correct an inadvertent pricing
error." Id. at 16.
41 PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29991. In May 2015, DOT issued a notice stating that, as a matter of "prosecutorial discretion," it would not enforce the prohibition against post-purchase price increases when a carrier or ticket agent
corrects a mistaken fare, subject to certain conditions. Notice, Enforcement Policy Regarding Mistaken Fares (May 8, 2015), https://www.transportation.gov/
sites/dot.gov/files/docs/MistakenFarePolicyStatement05082015.pdf.
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STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN MARKET
FORCES AND REGULATION

Even assuming DOT has the requisite statutory authority to
adopt regulations such as those discussed above, this does not
resolve the question of whether it serves the public interest to do
so. Highly detailed regulations curb innovation, impose inefficiencies on the marketplace, and mandate a sameness in how
carriers and intermediaries structure and market their services
to consumers. Such micro-regulation may be justified if necessary to prohibit specific instances of market failure or actual
consumer harm. DOT's recent approach, however, appears to
resemble the regulatory equivalent of "helicopter parenting": a
determination to micro-manage the relationship between air
carriers/ticket agents and consumers, whom DOT apparently
does not believe to be capable of making reasonably informed
purchasing decisions based on comparing product offerings and
relying on their own and other consumers' service
42
experiences.
The pervasive role of the Internet in our commerce and society, including in the business of air transport, has substantially
enhanced consumers' ability to inform themselves quickly and
conveniently about the full range of travel service options that
are available to them. Consumers have almost instantaneous access to more and better information, and DOT has recognized
that this is a great benefit to consumers.43 Yet DOT is now seeking to regulate the Internet's role in the advertising and sale of
air transportation.44 What is the evidence that Internet-based innovations in air travel distribution are increasing the risk of conWhile DOT's "re-regulation" of air transportation has been aggressive in the
consumer protection arena, ironically, DOT has failed to act with sufficient urgency when the efficient establishment of foundational regulations is essential to
enable market development. For example, the FAA was dilatory in issuing proposed regulations governing the commercial use of small unmanned aircraft. See
generally Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015). DOT, meanwhile, has failed to explain
the reasons for its delay in issuing final charter broker regulations, thereby inhibiting companies from implementing new, innovative business models that may
transform the charter market for FAR Part 135 operators. See generally Enhanced
Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,880 (proposed Sept. 30, 2013).
43 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 976, 1019
(Jan. 7, 2004); Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, Statement of
General Policy, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,366, 69,373 (proposed Nov. 15, 2002).
44 Berg, supra note 28, at 4.
42
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sumer deception? If a carrier or ticket agent holds out a
deceptive display regarding fares and services, consumers will
recognize the deception and communicate their displeasure,
not only via complaints to the service provider and/or DOT, but
also to the public, for example, via social media. a5 The ultimate
sanction will be the reluctance of consumers to purchase from
that air carrier or ticket agent or to rely on that air travel website
as a public perception takes hold as to the unreliability or untrustworthiness of that source. That is the power of the Internet.
The FTC refers to this as the power of markets to "selfcorrect."46
The Internet's other great power in the air transport context
is as a driver of innovation. 47 Air transport service providers are
among the most innovative in the global economy.4 " These innovations defy the boundaries of DOT's regulatory framework,
which continues to be rooted in a 20th century frame of reference: terms like "ticket agents" and "indirect air carriers" are
poor catch-all categories for purposes of understanding the consumer benefits of a meta-search site, such as Google Flight or
Kayak, or other companies that are devising new models for brokering air charter services. 49 DOT, instead of focusing on adapting its regulatory regime to harness (or at least not undermine)
the potential of the new marketplace, has responded by looking
for ways to place innovators within one of DOT's long-established categories of regulated entities and then to require these
companies to conform their new, innovative products to DOT
45Lauren Silverman, Airline Social Media "Command Centers" Direct Complaint
Traffic, NPR (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/10/347468354/air
line-social-media-command-centers-direct-complaint-traffic.
46 In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 97 (1984) (App.: Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17,
1984)).
47 Berg, supra note 28, at 3.
The Economic & Social Benefits of Air Transport
48 See AIR TRANSPORT AciON G'.,
22 (Sept. 2005), http://www.icao.int/meetings/wrdss2011/Documents/Joint
Workshop2005/ATAG SocialBenefitsAirTransport.pdf.
49 Paul Ruden, The Travel Agency Perspective: Ancillary Service Transactability Will
Benefit Consumers and Competition, 27 No. 3 AIR & SPACE LAW. 11, 11-12 (2014).
DOT has proposed to regulate meta-search sites such as Google Flight and Kayak
under a new definition of "ticket agent," even though these companies do not
sell tickets but rather provide a quick, user-friendly source of aggregated information about schedules and fares and the ability for a consumer to click-through to
the website of a particular travel service provider without any cost to the consumer or obligation to purchase. PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29974.
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rules that were adopted decades earlier.5 ° It is understandable
that a regulatory agency cannot adapt and reform itself with the
dynamism of start-up private sector companies. But the problem
is not just one of nimbleness and responsiveness: it is also one of
focus. DOT is focused on saying "stop" and "don't do this" and
"do it this way and only this way," with little apparent concern
that these strictures, imposed in the cause of protecting consumers, may actually be harming consumers by denying them a
broader range of innovative new service options and the greater
intensity of competition that such innovation can deliver.
In a recently published article, Robert Kneisley, Associate
General Counsel of Southwest Airlines, sounded a warning
against what he calls the "regulatory ratchet."'" Kneisley's argument is that regulations, once adopted, are rarely revised or
eliminated.5 2 They often remain in the Code of Federal Regulations for years, even decades, after market forces have changed
the circumstances under which the rules were adopted. 5' He argues that new regulations must be weighed against their costs
and advocates a fundamental paradigm shift in terms of agencies' accountability for the continuing net benefit of their regulations. 54 These regulations unquestionably impose ongoing

costs on airlines, ticket agents, and consumers, 55 but it is unknown whether these regulations deliver benefits and, if so,
whether those benefits sufficiently outweigh their costs. Kneisley
advocates the adoption of "sunset" provisions that would require
an agency to conduct periodic rulemaking proceedings (on the
record, with an opportunity for public comment) to determine
whether a rule should be retained, modified, or eliminated.56

50

Ruden, supra note 49, at 11-13.

51 Robert W. Kneisley, Fixing the Regulatoy Ratchet, 27 No. 1 AIR & SPACE LAW. 4,

4 n.1 (2014).
52

Id. at 4.

53 Id. at 6.
54 Id. at 4, 6.
55 Id. at 4.
56 Id. at 6-7. Presidential administrations periodically direct agencies to conduct reviews of their regulations. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg.
3821, 3822-23 (Jan. 21, 2011) (Obama administration order for agencies to review and potentially eliminate unnecessary regulations). Such reviews, however,
have not resulted in a fundamental change in DOT's approach to regulation.
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DOT'S "AGGRESSIVE" ENFORCEMENT APPROACH

In recent years, DOT's enforcement office has adopted a
"very, very aggressive"5 7 approach to investigating and initiating
legal action against air carriers and ticket agents for a wide
range of alleged violations of DOT's expanding body of regulations.5 8 The staffing of DOT's Office of Aviation Enforcement
and Consumer Protection has roughly doubled in size over the
past fifteen years.59 As of September 2014, its legal function, the
Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings (C-70), had a
twenty-person staff, including seventeen attorneys, while the Aviation Consumer Protection Division (C-75) also had a twentyperson staff.6 ° DOT has deployed these additional resources in a
concerted effort to increase the number and range of its investigations and enforcement activity.6" In addition, DOT has extracted substantially inflated amounts of civil penalties from its
targets.6 2 As former DOT Secretary Ray LaHood reported,
"[u]nder the Obama Administration, the Department has aggressively enforced its airline consumer rules. Between 2009 and
2012, the Department's Aviation Enforcement Office issued 203
civil penalties totaling $16.5 million in fines, compared to 105
63
penalties and $8.8 million in fines the previous four years.
DOT's staff of enforcement attorneys have discretion to determine the cases they wish to investigate and how aggressively they
57 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Transcript of First Meeting of Advisory Committee on
Aviation Consumer Protection (June 28, 2012), 14-15 (opening statement of
Robert Rivkin, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation); see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Lowest Numbers of Tarmac Delays on Record in 2014 (Feb. 10, 2015) (quoting DOT Secretary Anthony Foxx: "We have
aggressively enforced, and will continue to aggressively enforce, our tarmac delay
rules"); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Airline Consumer Protection (Jan.
31, 2013) ("the Department has aggressively enforced its airline consumer rules")
[hereinafter Airline Consumer Protection Press Release].
58 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Transcript of First Meeting of Advisory Committee on
Aviation Consumer Protection (June 28, 2012), 14-15.
59 Anne Hammond et al., U.S. Dep't of Transp. Aviation Consumer Prot. Div.,
Powerpoint Presentation to Association for Airline Passenger Rights in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 2014).
60 Id. By contrast, in 1988, the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings had a staff of eight attorneys, while the Consumer Affairs Division had thirteen employees. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, DOT ARLINE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT,
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. MEAD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS (Apr. 21, 1988), 7.
61 Airline Consumer Protection Press Release, supra note 57.
62 Id.

63 Id.
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wish to pursue civil penalties,64 as well as the amount of penalty
to be sought. In recent years, however, prosecutorial restraint
has become less evident at DOT, even in cases in which the alleged violation was indisputably inadvertent, the evidence of actual consumer harm non-existent, or in cases involving a carrier
or ticket agent of small size and limited financial resources.
DOT's ability to generate a large number of consent orders and
a substantial total amount of civil penalties is attributable not
only to the broad scope of detailed, exacting regulations, but
also due to the restrained response of air carriers and ticket
agents, which are naturally reluctant to litigate against their regulator.65 Consequently, DOT has been able to establish precedent, the legal validity of which has not been tested in court.
DOT recently appears to be seeking to establish what may effectively be a strict liability regime for certain types of alleged
violations. While DOT eschews the term "strict liability," it seems
appropriate when DOT seeks to hold carriers and ticket agents
culpable even in cases in which there is no evidence of either
intent to deceive or actual consumer harm. Holding carriers lia64 In the PP3 NPRM, DOT proposes to amend "the tarmac delay rule to clarify
that the Department may impose penalties for tarmac delay violations on a per
passenger basis." PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29992. Carriers have consistently
disputed DOT's assertion that it has statutory authority to assess civil penalties on
a per-passenger basis. DOT claims that "[i] t has long been the Department's policy that each consumer affected by an unlawful carrier practice is a separate violation." PP3 NPRM, supra note 18, at 29992. Significantly, however, DOT does not
cite any statutory language or legislative history to support its position. Airlines
for America (A4A), by contrast, roots its opposition to DOT's proposal in the
statutory text, legislative history, and case law. As A4A points out, the applicable
statutory provision authorizes DOT to assess civil penalties on a per-violation basis, with a "separate violation" being deemed to occur "for each day" or "if applicable, for each flight involving the violation." Comments of Airlines for America,
Sept. 29, 2014 (Docket DOT-OST-2014-000056), at 29 (citing 49 U.S.C.
§ 46301(a)(2)) [hereinafter A4A Comments]. This legally questionable effort
(under the guise of providing a "clarification") to elude clear statutory language
is intended to enable DOT to inflate exponentially the maximum amount of a
potential civil penalty for a tarmac delay violation. As A4A pointed out, under
DOT's proposal, in the case of a tarmac delay involving a B747-400 aircraft carrying 416 passengers, the maximum penalty amount would be $11.44 million instead of $27,500 (the maximum amount authorized under the statute per flight
or per day). Id. at 27-28.
65 Delta Air Lines recently bucked this trend when it refused to settle a case in
which DOT is alleging that Delta violated DOT's codeshare disclosure regulations. The case is now pending before a DOT administrative law judge. See Complaint, Delta Air Lines, Inc. Violations of 14 C.F.R. Part 257 and 49 U.S.C.
§ 41712 Enforcement Proceeding (Dec. 23, 2014) (DOT-05T-2014-0229).
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ble for mistaken fares is an example of this trend; 66 another is a
recently issued consent order involving a foreign air carrier, Lufthansa (LH) .67
In that Order, LH agreed to pay a $30,000 civil penalty
($15,000 of which was due immediately with the balance to be
forgiven based on subsequent compliance).6

The Order, for

those who are familiar with such DOT documents, reads in a
formulaic way, which masks the fact that the Order establishes
what appears to be a new precedent69 whereby a carrier or ticket
agent may be deemed to have violated the prohibition against
unfair or deceptive practices based on an inadvertent error,
even in the absence of any evidence of intent to deceive or ac70
tual consumer harm.

The facts of the case are straightforward: Due to a temporary
malfunction on LH's website, certain fares that were identified
in response to a consumer search were not available for
purchase on the website.7 This was not a "bait and switch" scenario in which a carrier is accused of having advertised a low
fare that was not actually available for purchase (either because
the fare was illusory or due to a lack of inventory for sale) in an
effort to lure consumers into purchasing a higher, but available,
fare. In LH's case, the fare was correct and inventory was available for purchase.72 Indeed, inventory remained available for
purchase at all times, both directly from LH by phone and
through ticket agents.73 LH remedied the temporary website
malfunction promptly, but while it was in effect, a single con66

14 C.F.R. § 399.88.

See Lufthansa German Airlines Violations of 49 U.S.C. § 41712, Dep't of
Transp., Order 2015-1-17, Docket 05T 2015-0002 (Jan. 22, 2015).
68 Id. at 3.
69 In the LH Order, DOT "holds that providing erroneous and misleading information in connection with fare advertisements to be a violation of 49 U.S.C.
41712." Id. at 1. DOT cites one previous airline consent order from 2008 and an
Industry Letter issued by the Secretary of Transportation to the airline and travel
agent community in 1994 as precedent to support this statement. Id. at 1 n.1.
Those cited materials support the proposition that the dissemination of "misleading information" may violate section 41712, but make no reference whatsoever to
"erroneous... information" or the proposition that an air carrier (or ticket agent)
could be deemed to have violated section 41712 for an unintentional act or omission that actually redounds to the detriment of the carrier. Id. at 1 (emphasis
added).
67

70

Id. at 2 n.2.

Id. at 2.
Id.
73 Id.
71
72
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sumer complained to DOT that she could not book the fare on
LH's website. 4 When LH became aware of the situation, it offered to sell the fare to the consumer and insisted that if the
consumer had called LH (as its website encourages consumers
to do) it would have sold her the fare.75 Thus, far from being the
type of "bait and switch" scenario DOT has long prohibited, the
website malfunction was harmful to LH, temporarily undermining the airline's ability to sell tickets.
DOT, despite a lack of evidence of intent to deceive on LH's
part or actual consumer harm, initiated enforcement action. LH
ultimately (and reluctantly) agreed to settle the matter rather
than litigate against its regulator.76 In doing so, LH continued to
dispute the legal basis for DOT's action.7 7
The LH Order appears to impose a new, strict liability standard for technical malfunctions affecting the operation of a carrier's (or ticket agent's) website, even where there is no
evidence of intent to deceive or actual consumer harm, as is
generally required under the FTC's interpretation of its "unfair
and deceptive practices" authority. This standard is one that no
organization (certainly not a government agency) could be certain of satisfying: that its website will never (even on a temporary
basis) fall victim to a technical malfunction.
WV.

CONCLUSION

DOT, in recent years, has expanded dramatically the scope of
its regulations and adopted an avowedly aggressive approach to
enforcement. This has imposed an unprecedented level of compliance complexity on regulated parties, particularly in an environment in which any violations or even minor compliance
lapses may be subject to enforcement action by DOT in pursuit
of ever larger civil penalty amounts. Recent DOT actions (in
both the rulemaking and enforcement contexts) raise questions
about whether DOT has exceeded the scope of its statutory authority. Those questions may ultimately be adjudicated in court.
Given the reluctance of regulated parties to litigate against
DOT, however, such legal challenges to DOT action are rare.
Before DOT proposes a new rule or initiates enforcement action
Id.
Id.
76 Id. at 3.
77 Id. ("Lufthansa ... disagrees with [DOT's] view that a technical malfunction
of its website constitutes a violation of 49 U.S.C. 41712.").
74
75
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in unprecedented ways, it should consider carefully the legal
foundation for its proposed action. While DOT's statutory authority is broadly worded, it remains limited, both by its own
terms and also by Congress's direction to DOT to "plac [e] maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and
potential competition."7 In promulgating new regulations,
DOT should not preempt the generally "self-correcting" marketplace unless it has developed a detailed record, including an objective analysis demonstrating that the quantified benefits of
DOT's proposed regulations exceed quantified costs by a substantial margin, recognizing that those costs are likely to be
borne by consumers and that the imposition of regulations may
undermine market innovations that would benefit consumers.
78

49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a) (6).

